M i ł b 21 2026 | 9 R-17 | „Pierwsza przyczyna” nie wyczerpuje pojęcia Boga Rozdziały: 2.2 · 2.3 · 3.8 | Funkcja: krytyka redukcji deistycznej „Czysta «pierwsza przyczyna» [...] nie jest Bogiem, lecz hipotezą graniczną nauk przyrodniczych. [...] Tylko tam, gdzie stworzenie i przymierze spotykają się, można rzeczywiście mówić o stworzeniu [...]. Idea stworzenia znajduje się na innej płaszczyźnie: rzeczywistość jako całość jest pytaniem, które odsyła poza siebie.”

“A pattern is an abstract structure which correlates in special ways to mind, or is mind correlative. A design is a deliberately intended or produced pattern. To be designed is to exemplify a design.”

“Counterflow refers to things running contrary to what, in the relevant sense, would (or might) have resulted or occurred had nature operated freely. [...] indications of counterflow typically underlie our evidences that something has resulted from finite agent design.”

“The underlying idea is that intelligent alien cultures might [...] produce electromagnetic signatures that would be distinguishable from anything generated by purely natural processes. [...] In the appropriate type of alien case, design would be a legitimate and straightforwardly ‘scientific’ explanatory concept.”

“Western science initially carried a strong commitment to [nature as a deliberately designed artifact] [...]. Exactly what is the difference between the alien design and the supernatural design cases? And exactly why would that difference be scientifically relevant?”

“A supernatural being who created the cosmos could presumably build intended patterns and structures into the primordial [...] initial conditions of the cosmos, or into the very laws and constants of the cosmos. [...] I will divide supernatural pattern-producing activity into four broad categories.”

“A supernatural creating agent [...] could infuse design into the cosmos [...] by deliberate, calculated selection of laws, constants, and primordial boundary conditions. Such an agent could set in motion a system designed to [...] generate specified phenomena, without any further intervention.”

“Nature’s laws have often been cited for their symmetry, their elegance, their order, their unity, their exquisite meshing, and for the harmonies sung by their mathematical structure. [...] a supernatural creative agency could intentionally build mind-correlative patterns into the law structure of a cosmos.”

“Being pronatural [...] does not preclude something also being a deliberately intended result [...]. Conversely, that something is a product of deliberate supernatural design does not imply nomic discontinuity or gaps in nature, nor does it imply intervention [...]. Discovering a wholly natural process [...] entails only that if it is designed, the relevant agent activity is primordial.”

“Secondary marks alone just won’t do the job of supporting design cases. [...] complexity [...] will never constitute evidence of design, no matter how high the degree of complexity or how low the probability. [...] They are simply different concepts.”

“PDR: any bridge property is design-relevant simpliciter. [...] if something would constitute evidence of design in the context of some presumed gap in nature, then it will also constitute at least some degree of evidence of design even if the gap in question gets closed naturally.”

“Active functionality and maintenance of high degrees of stable complexity intuitively suggest design. [...] these sorts of systems suggest both mind correlativity and value (or more generally, purpose).”

“Design explanations of structures and phenomena in nature can be rationally legitimate. [...] it is probably rationally permissible although not evidentially obligatory to hold [some design positions]. [...] such conclusions are often not rationally forced.”

Rozdziały: 2.3 | Funkcja: krytyka uproszczonego empiryzmu “Science cannot be done without a substantial fund of nonempirical principles and presuppositions. [...] the criterion for scientific legitimacy for nonempirical presuppositions runs through the nonempirical category—not simply along its boundary.”

M i ł b 21 2026 | 16 D-14 | Dwa możliwe cele nauki i ukryty naturalizm Rozdziały: 2.3 | Funkcja: analiza metodologiczna “One possible aim of science might be to discover [...] the purely natural realm. But a different possible aim might be to discover [...] the actual world. [...] To take the aims mentioned as identical is simply to presuppose philosophical naturalism.”

“The necessary conditions for testing include (i) that the theory [...] be linked in specifiable ways to some identifiable, recognizable phenomenon [...] and (ii) that that link [...] be reliably stable [...].”

“It has been claimed that [design theories] violate the very definition of science, that they are insufficiently empirical, are untestable, hyperflexible, and lack genuine content. [...] merely stating the charges is taken to constitute refutation. However [...] the situation is perhaps not quite so simple.”

“Darwinian evolution may indeed have destroyed some gap arguments, [but] it had little consequence for deeper design arguments involving [...] natural laws and primordial initiating conditions. [...] the fact that design theories were currently barred from science need have no permanent consequences.”

“Design concepts might function instrumentally [...] [or] sketch a heuristic picture intuitively suggesting conceptual directions [...]. [...] if a broader conceptual framework [...] suggests a fruitful (and correct) theory, that should count as evidence for that broader conceptual framework.”

“The most basic suggestion from a design outlook might simply be an expectation that the physical world would in some way make sense. [...] Mind-correlative patterns would necessarily be built in and could be discovered. Structures would be in principle intelligible [...]. Consistent operation—uniformity—would be reasonably anticipated.”