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Craig, William Lane; Moreland, J. P., 2009- Natural Theology

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Autor / redaktor: Craig, William Lane; Moreland, J. P.
Tytuł: Natural Theology
Identyfikator: craig-william-lane-moreland-j-p-natural-theology
Źródło w pierwotnych plikach: pozycje ogólne

Table of Contents

Title Pane
Copyright Pane
Notes on Contributors
Introduction

Chapter 1 – The Project of Natural Theology

Does Theistic Natural Theology Rest upon a Mistake?
A Foundation for Natural Theology
Nontheistic Natural Theology
Virtues and Vices of Inquiry
References

Chapter 2 – The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument

1. Introduction
2. The PSR
3. Nonlocal CPs
4. Toward a First Cause
5. The Gap Problem
6. Conclusions and Further Research
References

Chapter 3 – The Kalam Cosmological Argument

Introduction
2.0. Did the Universe Begin to Exist?
1.0. Everything That Begins to Exist Has a Cause
3.0. The Cause of the Universe
Properties of the First Cause
Objections
Conclusion
References

Chapter 4 – The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of…

1. Introduction: Setting Up the Argument
2. The Evidence for Fine-Tuning
3. Epistemic Probability
4. Determining k’ and the Comparison Range
5. Justifying Premises (1) and (2)
6. The Multiverse Hypothesis
7. Miscellaneous Objections
8. Conclusion: Putting the Argument in Perspective
References

Chapter 5 – The Argument from Consciousness

Section One: The Backdrop for Locating Consciousness in a Naturalist Ontology
Section Two: The AC
Section Three: John Searle and Contingent Correlation
Section Four: Timothy O’Connor and Emergent Necessitation
Section Five: Colin McGinn and Mvsterian „Naturalism”
Conclusion
Further Reading
References

Chapter 6 – The Argument from Reason

Introduction
The Nature of the Argument
The History of the Argument
Subdividing the Argument
Five Popular Objections
References

Chapter 7 – The Moral Argument

An Argument From Evolutionary Naturalism
An Argument from Personal Dignity
References

Chapter 8 – The Argument from Evil

Evil and Contemporary Philosophical Orthodoxy
Defense versus Theodicy
The Free Will Defense
bike’s Purpose and Perfect Happiness
Developing a Theodicy
Adams and Horrendous Evil
Plantinga’s „O Felix Culpa” Theodicy
Beasts and the Problem of Evil
References

Chapter 9 – The Argument from Religious Experience

The Experiential Roots of Religion
The ARE in the Twentieth Century
The Decline of Traditional Foundationalism and Stock
Objections to RE
The ARE via the Principle of Critical Trust (PCT)
RE and TE
Conceptual Coherence of TE
Intracoherence of TE
The Structure of the CTA
The Impartiality Argument for the PCT
Objections to the ARE
The ARE in the Twenty-First Century
References

Chapter 10 – The Ontological Argument

la. The Validity of Anselm’s Ontological Argument
lb. The Truth of the Anselmian Premises
lc. On Whether Anselm’s Ontological Argument Begs theQuestion
ld. On Parodies
2a. The Validity of the Ontological Argument of Descartes and Leibniz
2b. On the Truth of the Descartes-Leibniz Premises
2c. Critiques of the Descartes-Leibniz Ontological Argument
3. Ontological Arguments of the Twentieth Century
4a. Gôdel’s Ontological Argument
4b. On Whether Godel’s Argument is Sound
5. The Modal Perfection Argument
6. The Temporal-Contingency Argument
7. ConclusionReferences
Appendix 1. Logic Matters
Appendix 2. Formal Proofs of Some Modal Arguments

Chapter 11 – The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection…

Introduction
Goal and Scone of the Argument
The Concept of a Miracle
Textual Assumptions
Background Facts: Death and Burial
The Salient Facts: W. D. and P
Probabilistic Cumulative Case Arguments: Nature and Structure
The Testimony of the Women: Bayes Factor Analysis
The Testimony of the Disciples: Baves Factor Analysis
The Conversion of Paul: Baves Factor Analysis
The Collective Force of the Salient Facts
Independence
Burned Maxim and Worldview Worries
Plantinga’s Principle of Dwindling Probabilities
Knavery, Folly, and the Love of Wonder
Conclusion
References

Index

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