“Being pronatural [...] does not preclude something also being a deliberately intended result [...]. Conversely, that something is a product of deliberate supernatural design does not imply nomic discontinuity or gaps in nature, nor does it imply intervention [...]. Discovering a wholly natural process [...] entails only that if it is designed, the relevant agent activity is primordial.”

“Secondary marks alone just won’t do the job of supporting design cases. [...] complexity [...] will never constitute evidence of design, no matter how high the degree of complexity or how low the probability. [...] They are simply different concepts.”

“PDR: any bridge property is design-relevant simpliciter. [...] if something would constitute evidence of design in the context of some presumed gap in nature, then it will also constitute at least some degree of evidence of design even if the gap in question gets closed naturally.”

“Active functionality and maintenance of high degrees of stable complexity intuitively suggest design. [...] these sorts of systems suggest both mind correlativity and value (or more generally, purpose).”

“Design explanations of structures and phenomena in nature can be rationally legitimate. [...] it is probably rationally permissible although not evidentially obligatory to hold [some design positions]. [...] such conclusions are often not rationally forced.”

Rozdziały: 2.3 | Funkcja: krytyka uproszczonego empiryzmu “Science cannot be done without a substantial fund of nonempirical principles and presuppositions. [...] the criterion for scientific legitimacy for nonempirical presuppositions runs through the nonempirical category—not simply along its boundary.”

M i ł b 21 2026 | 16 D-14 | Dwa możliwe cele nauki i ukryty naturalizm Rozdziały: 2.3 | Funkcja: analiza metodologiczna “One possible aim of science might be to discover [...] the purely natural realm. But a different possible aim might be to discover [...] the actual world. [...] To take the aims mentioned as identical is simply to presuppose philosophical naturalism.”

“The necessary conditions for testing include (i) that the theory [...] be linked in specifiable ways to some identifiable, recognizable phenomenon [...] and (ii) that that link [...] be reliably stable [...].”

“It has been claimed that [design theories] violate the very definition of science, that they are insufficiently empirical, are untestable, hyperflexible, and lack genuine content. [...] merely stating the charges is taken to constitute refutation. However [...] the situation is perhaps not quite so simple.”

“Darwinian evolution may indeed have destroyed some gap arguments, [but] it had little consequence for deeper design arguments involving [...] natural laws and primordial initiating conditions. [...] the fact that design theories were currently barred from science need have no permanent consequences.”

“Design concepts might function instrumentally [...] [or] sketch a heuristic picture intuitively suggesting conceptual directions [...]. [...] if a broader conceptual framework [...] suggests a fruitful (and correct) theory, that should count as evidence for that broader conceptual framework.”

“The most basic suggestion from a design outlook might simply be an expectation that the physical world would in some way make sense. [...] Mind-correlative patterns would necessarily be built in and could be discovered. Structures would be in principle intelligible [...]. Consistent operation—uniformity—would be reasonably anticipated.”

“There is no compelling conceptual basis for any blanket prohibition on exploring applications or implications of the idea of supernatural design within the scientific context. Some design theories may be inappropriate in some instances, but that is perfectly consistent with others being in principle legitimate.”

“The Design Inference gives no guidance [on] whether or not some specific characteristic exhibited in some natural phenomenon really is a reliable or reasonable design indicator—leaving that to ‘insight,’ which operates in an area of ‘mystery.’”

„W zależności zaś od tego, gdzie ustanowi się granice akceptowalnych w nauce wyjaśnień, niezwykle szeroki zakres uzasadniania naukowego obejmowany jest przez „wnioskowanie do najlepszego wyjaśnienia”.”

„W takim razie tak samo jak dane obserwacyjne mogą być obciążone teoretycznie, tak teorie mogą być obciążone metafizycznie lub nawet teologicznie.”

„Za największy ze wszystkich cudów powinniśmy uważać to, że najbardziej adekwatne sformułowanie tego prawa w każdym nieuprzedzonym umyśle stwarza wrażenie, że przyrodą rządzi racjonalna, celowa wola.”

„Stajemy po stronie nauki […] ponieważ mamy odgórnie przyjęte zobowiązanie, mianowicie zobowiązanie wobec materializmu. […] Co więcej, ten materializm jest absolutny, albowiem nie możemy pozwolić, by Boska Stopa przekroczyła nasz próg.”

„Naturalizm filozoficzny może być słuszny lub nie (nauka po prostu nie rozstrzyga tego), ale skoro nauka nie może badać sfery nadnaturalnej, to jej istotna metodologiczna zasada głosi, że nauka musi postępować tak, jak gdyby naturalizm filozoficzny był słuszny.”

„W każdym razie definicje są ludzkimi konstrukcjami i nie jest jasne, dlaczego ludzkie definicje miałyby mieć normatywne znaczenie dla prawdy o obiektywnym kosmosie.”