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Editors’ introduction — v
Introduction: Science and pseudoscience — 1
1 Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes — 8
1 Science: reason or religion? — 8
2 Fallibilism versus falsificationism — 10
a Dogmatic (or naturalistic) falsificationism. The empirical basis — 12
b Methodological falsificationism. The ‘empirical basis’ — 20
c Sophisticated versus naive methodological falsificationism. Progressive and degenerating problemshifts — 31
3 A methodology of scientific research programmes — 47
a Negative heuristic: the ‘hard core’ of the programme — 48
b Positive heuristic: the construction of the ‘protective belt’ and the relative autonomy of theoretical science — 49
c Two illustrations: Prout and Bohr — 52
1 Prout: a research programme progressing in an ocean of anomalies — 53
2 Bohr: a research programme progressing on inconsistent foundations — 55
d A new look at crucial experiments: the end of instant rationality — 68
1 The Michelson-Morley experiment — 73
2 The Lummer-Pringsheim experiments — 79
3 Beta-decay versus conservation laws — 81
4 Conclusion. The requirement of continuous growth — 86
4 The Popperian versus the Kuhnian research programme — 90
Appendix: Popper, falsificationism and the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’ — 93
2 History of science and its rational reconstructions — 102
Introduction — 102
1 Rival methodologies of science; rational reconstructions as guides to history — 103
a Inductivism — 103
b Conventionalism — 105
c Methodological falsificationism — 108
d Methodology of scientific research programmes — 110
e Internal and external history — 118
2 Critical comparison of methodologies: history as a test of its rational reconstructions — 121
a Falsificationism as a meta-criterion: history ‘falsifies’ falsificationism (and any other methodology) — 123
b The methodology of historiographical research programmes. History – to varying degrees – corroborates its rational reconstructions — 131
c Against aprioristic and anti-theoretical approaches to methodology — 136
d Conclusion — 138
3 Popper on demarcation and induction — 139
Introduction — 139
1 Popper on demarcation — 140
a Popper’s game of science — 140
b How can one criticize the rules of the scientific game? — 144
c A quasi-Polanyiite ‘falsification’ of Popper’s demarcation criterion — 146
d An amended demarcation criterion — 148
e An amended meta-criterion — 151
2 Negative and positive solutions to the problem of induction: scepticism and fallibilism — 154
a The game of science and the search for truth — 154
b A plea to Popper for a whiff of ‘inductivism’ — 159
4 (with Elie Zahar) Why did Copernicus’s research programme supersede Ptolemy’s? — 168
Introduction — 168
1 Empiricist accounts of the ‘Copernican Revolution’ — 169
2 Simplicism — 173
3 Polyanyiite and Feyerabendian accounts of the Copernican revolution — 176
4 The Copernican revolution in the light of the methodology of scientific research programmes — 178
5 The Copernican revolution in the light of Zahar’s new version of the methodology of scientific research programmes — 184
6 A postscript on history of science and its rational reconstructions — 189
5 Newton’s effect on scientific standards — 193
1 The justificationist high road to psychologism and mysticism — 193
a Justificationism and its two poles: dogmatism and scepticism — 193
b Psychologistic justificationism — 195
c Justificationist fallibilism — 198
2 Newtonian methodology versus Newtonian method — 201
a Newton’s problem: the clash between standards and acheivements — 201
b Newtonians against metaphysical criticism — 202
c Newton’s idea of experimental proof and its credo quia absurdum — 208
d Newtonians and factual criticism — 214
e Newton’s double legacy — 220
References — 223
Lakatos bibliography — 237
Indexes — 240